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SEARCH AND SEIZURE-STOP AND FRISK-EXCLUDIBILITY OF Evi-
DENCE-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a weapon
seized by a police officer was admissible into evidence because the
officer conducted a valid Terry stop when he stopped a man fitting
the description of a suspect on an identified street corner looking
at a restaurant through binoculars in the rain.
Commonwealth v. Lagana, - Pa.-, 537 A.2d 1351 (1988).
On May 11, 1981, at approximately 7:30 p.m., a police officer re-
ceived a radio broadcast that there was a man on a street corner
with a gun.1 The broadcast described the man as a white male be-
tween twenty and twenty-five years of age and wearing a yellow
raincoat.2 The officer arrived on the scene within two minutes of
receiving the call and he noticed a man fitting the broadcasted
description looking through binoculars at a nearby restaurant.'
Although there were twenty to thirty people in the vicinity, only
one person, Joseph Lagana, was wearing a yellow raincoat." The
officer left his car, approached the suspect and immediately frisked
him." He discovered a revolver tucked in the waistband of Lagana's
pants.' Before arresting Lagana for various weapons offenses, the
officer noticed two cases sitting at Lagana's feet.7 When asked if
the cases belonged to him, Lagana responded ambiguously; there-
fore, the officer took the cases into custody with Lagana.s The
1. Commonwealth v. Lagana, - Pa. -, 537 A.2d 1351, 1352 (1988).
2. Id. The source of the broadcasted information was unknown. Id. at 1353.
3. Id. at 1352-53. The location identified in the radio broadcast was the corner of
Ninth and Wharton in Philadelphia. Brief for Appellee at 2. The restaurant was located
across the street from Lagana's position on the street corner. Brief for Appellant at 3.
4. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1353.
5. Id. Lagana was frisked before the officer asked him any questions. Brief for Appel-
lee at 3.
6. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1353. The gun discovered by the officer was a .32 caliber re-
volver. Id.
7. Id. The cases were a black camera case, a brown case and a small purple pouch. Id.
Lagana was charged under 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 6106, 6108 (Purdon 1983). The relevant portion of
section 6106 provides: "No person shall carry a firearm in any vehicle or concealed on or
about his person except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a license
therefor as provided in this subchapter." 18 Pa. C.S. § 6106 (Purdon 1983). The relevant
portion of section 6108 states: "No person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time
on public streets or upon any public property in a city of the first class unless: (1) such
person is licensed to carry a firearm." 18 Pa. C.S. § 6108 (Purdon 1983).
8. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1353. The defendant just shrugged his shoulders in response to
the officer's question about ownership of the cases. Brief for Appellant at 3.
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cases were examined at the police station without the benefit of a
search warrant.9 It was later determined that the contents were
stolen in a burglary.1" On June 9, 1981, burglary, theft, and crimi-
nal trespass charges were filed against Lagana."
On August 21, 1981, a suppression hearing was held to prevent
the burglary evidence from being presented at trial.12 The court
held that when the police officer stopped and frisked Lagana, an
arrest had occurred without probable cause. 3 The cases and their
contents were, therefore, suppressed as fruits of an illegal arrest."'
The Commonwealth elected not to appeal the order and nolle
prossed the burglary charges.
1 5
On September 8, 1981, a second suppression hearing was held to
prevent evidence of the gun from being presented at trial on the
weapons charges. 6 The basis of the motion was collateral estop-
pel.17 The trial judge stated that he was bound to rely on the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law as determined by the court in
the burglary evidence suppression hearing.18 Therefore, the judge
concluded that the gun, like the stolen goods, was the product of
an illegal arrest and should be suppressed. 9
The order suppressing evidence of the gun was appealed to the
9. Commonwealth v. Lagana, 510 Pa. 477, 479, 509 A.2d 863 (1986).
10. Id. The items in the cases included two cameras, a coin collection, four watches
and some jewelry. Brief for Appellant at 3.
11. Commonwealth v. Lagana, 334 Pa. Super. 100, 102, 482 A.2d 1101 (1984). For rea-
sons that do not appear in the record, the burglary and weapons violation charges were not
consolidated and progressed through the court system separately. Lagana, 510 Pa. at 479,
509 A.2d at 864.
12. Lagana, 334 Pa. Super. at 102, 482 A.2d at 1101. PA. R. CRIM. P. 323 governs the
suppression of evidence. The relevant portion of Rule 323 states: "The defendant or his
attorney may make a motion to the court to suppress any evidence alleged to have been
obtained in violation of the defendant's rights." Id.
13. Lagana, 334 Pa. Super. at 102, 482 A.2d at 1101. The judge believed probable
cause had not been established due to the unreliability of the radio broadcast. Brief for
Appellant at 4.
14. Lagana, 334 Pa. Super. at 102, 482 A.2d at 1101.
15. Id. The judge who suppressed the burglary evidence urged the Commonwealth to
appeal his decision. Brief for Appellant at 4. Believing that this evidence could also have
been suppressed because of the lack of a proper search warrant, the Commonwealth elected
not to appeal the order. Id. However, even with the burglary evidence suppressed due to
lack of a search warrant, it would have had no affect on the seizure of the gun. Id.
16. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1353.
17. Lagana, 510 Pa. at 483, 509 A.2d at 866. The ruling of the first suppression hearing
was incorporated into the record of the second hearing to allow review of the first decision
on appeal as if it had been entered anew. Id.
18. Id.
19. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1353.
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Pennsylvania Superior Court.2 0 The Commonwealth was seeking
reversal of the collateral estoppel order issued at the suppression
hearing for the gun and a remand to the court to make its own
findings.21 The superior court, in affirming the collateral estoppel
order, concluded that having met the requirements of collateral es-
toppel, the Commonwealth was barred from relitigating the issue
of the validity of the May 11, 1981 search.2
The Commonwealth then appealed the superior court ruling to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 8 Justice McDermott, writing for
the court, stated that the issue before the court was "whether col-
lateral estoppel should apply to pre-trial suppression rulings where
separate prosecutions arise from a single arrest. ' 24 Under the facts
of the Lagana case, the supreme court stated that the question did
not rise to constitutional proportions because jeopardy had not at-
tached during the first suppression hearing.25 Therefore, the court
was left to decide whether permitting collateral estoppel to control
was wise judicial policy.26
The policies offered in support of applying collateral estoppel in-
cluded that relitigation should not result in confinement of inno-
cent persons, protection of the accused's reliance on a determina-
tion of an issue in his favor, and judicial economy and prevention
of harassment of the accused by repeated proceedings.17 The su-
20. Brief for Appellant at 4-5.
21. Id.
22. Lagana, 334 Pa. Super. at 111, 482 A.2d at 1106.
23. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1353.
24. Lagana, 510 Pa. at 480, 509 A.2d at 864. This was a majority opinion, with Justices
Nix and Zappala concurring in the result. Id. Justice Hutchinson also concurred and filed a
separate opinion. Id.
25. Id. at 481, 509 A.2d at 864. No jeopardy attached in this case because under Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), jeopardy attaches only after a verdict is rendered. In Ashe,
the defendant was found not guilty of robbing one of six poker players. Id. The state sought
to try him a second time on a charge of robbing one of the other poker players. Id. The Ashe
court stated that the constitution forbids the prosecution from bringing the case before a
jury a second time after refining its presentation in light of the first case. Id. at 447.
26. Lagana, 510 Pa. at 481, 509 A.2d at 865. The court surveyed sister states' policies
on this issue before reviewing the policy arguments presented to the court. Id. Florida deter-
mined that the state was not collaterally estopped by prior suppression orders because the
defendant was never placed in jeopardy. Lagana, 334 Pa. Super. at 107, 482 A.2d at 1104.
Illinois held that the state was collaterally estopped by an order it chose not to appeal.
Louisiana decided the state was not collaterally estopped by prior suppression orders. Id.
New Jersey decided the state was collaterally estopped in cases that involved similar
charges, the same incident and the same evidence. Id. at 108, 482 A.2d at 1104.
27. Id. at 109, 482 A.2d at 1105. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected these pol-
icy arguments stating that suppression hearings are to test the legality of seized evidence,
and the decision should stand on its merits, supported by the record, whether or not the
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preme court was unconvinced that these policy arguments justified
applying collateral estoppel to suppression hearings.28 Thus, the
collateral estoppel order was reversed and the case was remanded
to the superior court to be decided on its merits.2 9
On remand, the superior court held that the judge in the first
suppression hearing had erred in ruling that Lagana had been ar-
rested prior to the officer seizing the gun and cases, stating that
the arrest did not occur until the weapon was discovered. 0 How-
ever, the court determined that the police officer did not have rea-
sonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. 1 Based on this holding,
the superior court affirmed the trial court's ruling to suppress the
evidence of the gun.2
The Commonwealth appealed and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court granted allocatur. 3 The supreme court stated that the stan-
dard of review announced in Commonwealth v. Hamlin34 was the
appropriate standard to use in review of the suppression court's
findings.3 5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed with the le-
gal conclusions reached by the superior court regarding the validity
of the stop. 6 The superior court had ruled the stop invalid because
the source of the information of the radio broadcast tipping the
defendant has to prove his assertion of how the evidence was twice obtained. Lagana, 510
Pa. at 482, 509 A.2d at 865. The court said that the record did not show that the Common-
wealth was vindictively trying to harass the defendant. Id. The court also stated that they
were confident the Commonwealth would follow accepted procedure for consolidating
charges arising out of the same transaction, rather than bring piecemeal prosecution to en-
hance their chances of success. Id.
28. Lagana, 510 Pa. at 482, 509 A.2d at 865.
29. Id. at 485, 509 A.2d at 866.
30. Commonwealth v. Lagana, 356 Pa. Super. 132, 136, 514 A.2d 179 (1986).
31. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1353. A Terry stop permits a police officer to conduct a brief
investigatory stop, including a pat down of an individual's outer clothing, if he has a reason-
able suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and the individual is armed and dangerous.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
32. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1353.
33. Id. Justice Larsen wrote the plurality opinion for the court.
34. 503 Pa. 210, 469 A.2d 137 (1983).
35. Id. In Hamlin, the police seized drugs pursuant to a search warrant that had been
completed with an incorrect date. Id. at 214, 469 A.2d at 138. Hamlin moved to suppress the
evidence because the warrant was defective. Id. at 213, 469 A.2d at 138. The court sup-
pressed the evidence. Id. at 214, 469 A.2d at 138. In reversing, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated that the Commonwealth had to meet the same burden as the defendant when
appealing a suppression order. Id. According to the Hamlin court, a suppression court may
only consider the defendant's evidence and the evidence of the prosecution which is uncon-
tradicted when the record is read as a whole. Id. The Lagana court concluded that the
appellate court, which was bound by findings of fact supported by the record, was not
bound by the court's legal conclusions. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1353-54.
36. Id. at 1354.
202
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officer regarding the man with the gun was unknown, the descrip-
tion of the suspect was vague, and the suspect's behavior was not
suspicious.1 7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court argued that the
stop was valid because it made no difference that the source of the
information was unknown. 8 The court stated that Lagana's pres-
ence on the street corner corroborated the anonymous informa-
tion. 9 The court further stated that Lagana matched the broad-
casted description, and his behavior, standing in the rain looking
through binoculars, was suspicious. 0 The court concluded that
given these circumstances, the police made a valid stop."'
Justice McDermott rejected Lagana's contention that the instant
case was the same as Commonwealth v. Anderson.4" The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court distinguished Anderson and Lagana on two
points."' The first distinction identified was the potential danger
presented by the suspect." In Anderson, the police were told to
look for an escapee from a drug rehabilitation program, but no
mention was made that he might be armed and dangerous.4 5 In-
contrast, the radio message in Lagana described a man with a gun
on a street corner.46 The court reasoned that the police acted rea-
sonably in believing that the suspect in Lagana posed a threat to
the public and the police officer's safety. 7 As a consequence, the
supreme court ruled that while the stop in Anderson was invalid,
the stop in Lagana was distinguishable and valid.
The supreme court determined that the second distinguishing
37. Lagana, 356 Pa. Super. at 137, 514 A.2d at 181.




42. Id., citing Commonwealth v. Anderson, 481 Pa. 292, 392 A.2d 1298 (1978). In An-
derson, police received a report that an escapee from a drug rehabilitation center was in a
local bar. Id. at 293, 392 A.2d at 1299. The police approached the man, asked him if he had
a weapon, then proceeded to touch his jacket without giving the man a chance to respond.
Id. at 294, 392 A.2d at 1299. A gun was discovered in the pocket resulting in the man's,
identified as Anderson, arrest. Id.
43. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1354.
44. Id.
45. Anderson, 481 Pa. at 293, 392 A.2d at 1299. There was no mention made in the
radio broadcast that the man the police were looking for was armed. Id.
46. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1354.
47. Id.
48. Id. The court in Anderson stated that Anderson did not pose a threat to public
safety and the police had no reasonable suspicion that he might be dangerous. Anderson,
481 Pa. at 298, 392 A.2d at 1301. The Lagana court stated that the police were reasonable in
believing the man they were looking for was armed because the radio broadcast identified
that the man had a gun. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1354.
1988
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factor between Anderson and Lagana involved the suspect's be-
havior at the time he was approached by the police."' Anderson
was approached as he sat in a bar.50 Lagana was standing on a
street corner in a downpour observing a fast food restaurant
through binoculars. 51 Justice McDermott concluded that the differ-
ent circumstances, combined with the broadcasted information,
Lagana's presence on the corner, and his behavior, indicated that
Lagana was the man the police were seeking.2
Lagana advanced a second argument that the gun was seized as
a product of an illegal arrest rather than a Terry stop. 3 The su-
preme court, relying on Commonwealth v. Bosurgi," stated that an
arrest occurs with "any act that indicates an intention to take a
person into custody and subjects him to . ..actual control ...
-55 Justice McDermott reasoned that the officer never manifested
an act to take Lagana into custody beyond that necessary to con-
duct a brief investigatory stop prior to discovering the gun."
Therefore, the supreme court concluded that the gun was not ob-
tained as a result of an illegal arrest.
57
After rejecting both of Lagana's arguments, the supreme court
reversed the superior court's ruling on the suppression order and
remanded the case for trial.5 8 Before ruling that the gun could be
presented as evidence on the weapons charges, the supreme court
first considered how the evidence was obtained .5  Evidence ob-
tained as a result of an illegal search and seizure must be excluded
at trial.8 0
49. Id.
50. Anderson, 481 Pa. at 293-94, 392 A.2d at 1299. The officers entered at the back of
the bar, and seeing that Anderson fit the description, the officers approached him. Id.
51. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1354.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1355.
54. 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963).
55. Id, at 63, 190 A.2d at 308 (quoting 5 AM. JUR. 2d, Arrest § 1, p. 695). Bosurgi was
searched after police officers investigating a burglary were tipped that the defendant was in
a bar trying to sell watches which the police suspected may have been stolen. Bosurgi, 411
Pa. at 58-59, 190 A.2d at 306. The legality of the search depended on the validity of the
arrest. Id. at 67-68, 190 A.2d at 310. The court considered what constituted an arrest and
stated that any act manifesting the intent to take someone into custody was an arrest. Id.
56. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1355.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1354.
60. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Mapp was the first case to forbid admit-
ting evidence in a state court that was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. Id. Rule 323 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure permits
Vol. 27:199
Recent Decision
Exclusion of evidence in a criminal prosecution obtained pursu-
ant to an illegal search and seizure had its beginnings in Weeks v.
United States.61 There, Weeks was arrested without a warrant and
charged with using the mails for the purpose of transporting cer-
tain coupons or tickets representing chances or shares in a lottery
in violation of the criminal code. 62 While this arrest was being car-
ried out, several police officers had gone to Weeks' house to search
it without a warrant. 8 The officers, as a product of their search,
found various papers and articles which were seized and subse-
quently turned over to the United States Marshall." The Mar-
shall, in the company of the officers, returned to Weeks' abode and
searched the premises again." There was also no warrant for this
second search."'
Prior to his trial, Weeks petitioned the court for the return of
his property.6 7 The court entered an order directing that property
not pertinent to the charge be returned, but the trial judge also
permitted the Marshall and the district attorney to retain evidence
pertinent to the case." Weeks renewed his petition at trial, but it
was again denied.69 After the evidence was introduced in court,
Weeks objected on the ground that the evidence was the product
of an illegal search and seizure in violation of the fourth and fifth
amendments to the constitution.7 0 The objection was overruled
and the evidence was admitted.7 ' After his conviction, Weeks ap-
the defendant to move for suppression of the evidence. PA. R. CRIM. PROC. 323.
61. 364 U.S. 206, 209 (1960).
62. 232 U.S. 383, 386 (1914).
63. Id. The defendant was arrested at his place of employment, an express company.
The officers searching the house did not have a search warrant, but entered the house after
neighbors told them where the key was kept. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The U.S. Marshall returned to search the house because he felt he may find
additional evidence. He was admitted to the house to execute the search by someone in the
house, possibly a border. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 387. The defendant set forth in his petition that the search was done with-
out warrant and thus, violated the fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. The
petition also set forth what property the defendant wanted returned. Id.
68. Id. at 388. The district attorney complied with the court order to return the de-
fendant's property, returning some and retaining other property. The district attorney sub-
mitted an exact list of what property was retained to use as evidence. Id.
69. Id. The court denied the petition for the return of the rest of the property when it
was renewed at trial. Id.
70. Id. The defendant contended the search of his home without a search warrant




pealed to the United States Supreme Court."
The Weeks Court stated that the purpose of the fourth amend-
ment is to place limitations on the power and authority of the judi-
ciary and federal officials. 78 The Supreme Court reasoned that un-
lawful search and seizure methods used to obtain convictions
destroy an individual's rights secured by the constitution, and
therefore, should not be condoned by the courts.74 The Weeks
Court found that the U.S. Marshall could only enter Weeks' home
to search it if the law enforcement official possessed the required
warrant. 75 The Supreme Court concluded that the Marshall pro-
cured the property illegally because of his failure to obtain a search
warrant, and the property should have been returned to Weeks
when the trial court ruled on his petition for the return of the
property.
76
The Weeks Court unobtrusively announced a second ruling per-
mitting evidence which has been improperly seized by local offi-
cials, not acting under any claim of federal authority, to be admit-
ted at trial. Thus, the property seized by the local police officers
without a warrant, before involving the U.S. Marshall, was admit-
ted into evidence in the federal criminal case.78
In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,7 9 the United
States Supreme Court extended the Weeks decision by declaring
that evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure "shall not
be used at all.' ' 80 The Silverthornes were arrested and detained for
several hours.8 1 During the period of internment, the Department
of Justice and the U.S. Marshall searched the Silverthornes' com-
72. Id. The defendant assigned two errors, the court's refusal to grant his petition for
the return of his property and permitting the use of the papers as evidence at trial. Id. at
389.
73. Id. at 392. Justice Day wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court. Id. at 386.
74. Id. at 392.
75. Id. at 393. The fourth amendment requires that for searches to be reasonable, they
must be carried out under a warrant taken out pursuant to sworn information which de-
scribes with reasonable particularity what is being searched for. Id.
76. Id. at 398. The Court ruled that prejudicial error had been committed when evi-
dence obtained by the U.S. Marshall without a warrant was admitted at trial. The Marshall,
a federal agent, seized the papers under color of authority and violated the defendant's
constitutional rights. Id.
77. Elkins, 364 U.S. at.210. The Court held that the fourth amendment was not di-
rected at the individual misconduct of state officials. Id.
78. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
79. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
80. Id. at 392. Justice Holmes wrote the majority opinion, with the Chief Justice and
Justice Pitney dissenting. Id.
81. Id. at 390.
Vol. 27:199206
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pany offices and removed books and papers to the district attor-
ney's office.8" The district court ordered a return of the
Silverthornes' property after the defendants petitioned to have
their property restored. 88 However, a new indictment was prepared
based on information acquired from copies of the seized docu-
ments. 4 The Silverthornes were served with subpoenas to produce
the originals and were found in contempt of court when they re-
fused to do so.
85
The Supreme Court, in reversing the contempt citation, stated
that while the government was in form condemning illegal seizure,
the law enforcement agencies were in substance trying to maintain
their right to use the information obtained through the illegal
seizure. 6 The Silverthorne Court determined that the government
could not use either the business records or the knowledge gleaned
from the records as evidence when they were obtained illegally.
87
The Court concluded that the government could use the knowledge
discovered from the Silverthornes' papers only if it could be estab-
lished by independent facts. 8
The United States Supreme Court re-examined the Weeks ex-
clusionary rule in Byars v. United States.89 Byars was arrested for
possession of counterfeit stamps used on bottled whiskey.90 The
stamps were found while local officers and a federal prohibition
agent were executing a search warrant issued by a state municipal
court.91 Because the stamps were not within the scope of the war-
82. Id. The Court stated that the federal agents "without a shadow of authority" made
a clean sweep of the company offices. Id. The employees were taken or told to go to the
office of the District Attorney of the United States, as well as being told to turn over all the
books and papers to the office. Id.
83. Id. at 391.
84. Id. The Court concluded that because the books were seized illegally under federal
authority they should be returned to the defendants. The copies that had been made of the
originals were impounded. Id.
85. Id. Although the district court found that the papers were seized illegally, they
ordered compliance with the subpoenas to produce the originals. Id. The son, Silverthorne,
was confined to jail until he would discharge the contempt charge, and the company was
fined. Id. at 390.
86. Id. at 391.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 392.
89. 273 U.S. 28 (1927). Justice Sutherland wrote the opinion for the Court. Id.
90. Id. at 29. The stamps were subsequently admitted into evidence over the defend-
ant's objection that they were seized illegally. Id.
91. Id. at 30. A local police officer was given the search warrant and he and three other
officers made the search. The local police officer requested that a federal agent who hap-
pened to be at the police station accompany them on the search. The only warrant the
officers had to execute the search was the one issued by the municipal court addressed to
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rant nor violative of state law, they were immediately placed in the
federal agent's possession."2
The Byars Court considered whether the federal prohibition
agent's participation in the search violated the fourth amend-
ment.93 The Supreme Court stated that mere participation by a
federal officer in a state initiated search does not per se rise to the
level of a federal undertaking. 94 The Court reasoned that the Byars
search amounted to a joint operation between local and federal au-
thorities because the search was undertaken by the federal agent
acting under the authority of his office.'5 Therefore, the Supreme
Court concluded that while the federal government possessed a
right to use evidence improperly seized by the state in a totally
local operation, federal participation under the color of federal au-
thority barred improperly seized evidence from being used in a
federal prosecution."
In Wolf v. Colorado,'7 the Supreme Court was presented with a
new issue pertaining to the excludibility of evidence obtained from
an illegal search and seizure.9" There, the Court addressed the
question of whether a criminal defendant convicted in a state court
for a state offense was denied due process of law under the four-
teenth amendment when the evidence admitted at the state trial
would have been excluded in a federal court under the fourth
amendment.99 The Court determined that the right to privacy
against unwarranted intrusion by the government was implicit in
the "concept of ordered liberty".100 Therefore, the search and
seizure clause was enforceable against the states through the due
process clause.101
The Wolf Court surveyed how individual state jurisdictions were
any peace officer of Des Moines. The warrant permitted a search for intoxicating liquors and
any materials to manufacture liquors. Id.
92. Id. at 31. Some of the stamps were found by a local officer and some by the
federal agent. The federal officer retained possession of all the stamps. Id.
93. Id. at 32.
94. Id. The federal agent was invited to join the search precisely because he was a
federal agent. Id. The stamps were given to the federal officer without question and consid-
ered by both the local and federal officers to pertain to a federal matter. Id. at 32-33.
95. Id. at 33.
96. Id. To permit the use of evidence illegally seized by federal authority would be to
violate the spirit of the fourth amendment. Id.
97. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Justice Frankfurter delivered the Court's opinion; Justice
Black concurred and Justices Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge dissented. Id.
98. Id. at 26.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 27.
101. Id.
208 Vol. 27:199
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ruling on the admissibility of evidence obtained by unlawful search
and seizure.10 2 The Court recognized that the federal courts ap-
plied the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment. 103 However, the Court found that there were
other ways of protecting an individual's fourth amendment rights,
and it would not condemn a state which selected an alternative
method for enforcing fourth amendment rights.10° Thus, the Su-
preme Court ultimately concluded that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment did not require state courts to adopt
the exclusionary rule with respect to evidence illegally seized by
state officials.106
The United States Supreme Court again considered the exclu-
sion doctrine in Elkins v. United States.10 6 In that case, state offi-
cials seized tape and wire recordings in the home of one of the
petitioners which led to a federal indictment. 0 7 Although two state
courts had ruled the seizure unlawful, a motion to suppress the
evidence was denied by a federal district court because there was
no showing that any federal agent had participated in the
seizure. 08 After reviewing the judicial history of the exclusionary
rule in the federal and state courts, 0 9 the Supreme Court decided
that if the evidence obtained by the state officers during a search
102. Id at 29. The Court listed an appendix describing how the individual states had
ruled on the admissibility of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure both before
and after the Weeks decision. Id. The Weeks decision excluded evidence obtained by unlaw-
ful search when done so under federal authority. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
103. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31.
104. Id. The three alternatives to try to enforce the search and seizure clause are judi-
cial exclusion of evidence obtained illegally, criminal prosecution of those violating the
clause, and civil action against the violators. Id. at 41.
105. Id. at 33.
106. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Justice Stewart wrote the Court's opinion and Justices
Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan and Whittaker, dissented. Id.
107. Id. at 207. The state officers received information that the defendant had obscene
motion pictures in his possession. The warrant permitted a search for obscene pictures and
sound recordings, but the officers found none of these materials. Instead, materials for wire-
tapping were found and seized. The evidence was suppressed because the search warrant
was invalid, and the state indictment was dismissed. The federal authorities brought a fed-
eral indictment after retrieving the evidence from state officials under a federal search war-
rant. Id.
108. Id. The federal agents had no knowledge that the search was being contemplated
until they read about it in the paper. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, reasoning that it was not necessary to decide whether the state search was legal
because federal agents did not participate in the search. Id. at 208.
109. Id. at 210-21. The Court began their review with Weeks, and included Byars and
Wolf. The Court included an appendix listing each individual state's rulings on the exclu-
sionary rule. Id. at 224-25.
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would have violated the petitioner's fourth amendment rights if
conducted by federal officials, the evidence would be inadmissible
in a federal criminal trial.110 The Court reasoned that because the
federal courts are sworn to uphold the constitution, judicial integ-
rity prevented the Court from condoning willful disobedience of
the constitution's provisions."
In Mapp v. Ohio,"2 the Supreme Court determined whether any
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation the fourth
amendment could be admissible in a state court."8 Mapp was con-
victed of possessing lewd and lascivious materials in violation of
Ohio law."" The evidence presented at trial was seized by state
officials in violation of the fourth amendment." 5 The state main-
tained that based on Wolf, the Ohio courts were not barred from
using unconstitutionally seized evidence." 6
The Supreme Court reasoned that since the fourth amendment
right to privacy was enforceable against the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the exclusion doc-
trine, an essential part of the privacy right, was also applicable." 7
The Supreme Court noted that it had strictly and equally enforced
other constitutional rights against both the states and the federal
government." 8 The Court also determined that adherence to the
same criteria for establishing lawful searches and seizure would
promote cooperation between federal and state law enforcement
agencies and protect individual rights." 9 Therefore, the Supreme
Court held that illegally seized evidence may not be admitted in
110. Id. at 223. Federal law does not permit any use of illegally obtained evidence in
federal court regardless of who seizes it. Id.
111. Id.
112. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
113. Id. at 643. Justice Clark delivered the opinion for the Court, in which Justices
Black and Douglas concurred, and Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker dissented.
Id.
114. Id. at 643.
115. Id. at 644. Police officers arrived at Mapp's home looking for a man wanted for
questioning. The officers demanded entrance, but after consultation with her attorney,
Mapp refused to admit them without a warrant. Several hours later the police forcibly en-
tered her home. When Mapp demanded to see a warrant, the police waved a paper claiming
it was a warrant. Id. The police then searched and seized the evidence. Id. at 645. At trial,
no warrant was produced. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 655. The fourth amendment right to privacy is enforceable against the state
with the same sanction of exclusion which is applicable to the federal government. Id.
118. Id.




In addition to analyzing whether the Lagana seizure was in com-
pliance with the fourth amendment, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court also had to determine whether the search was reasonable.
121
The United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of
protecting fourth amendment rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures as early as 1886 in Boyd v. United States.122 In that
case, Boyd was required to produce invoices for goods in his pos-
session in order to avoid forfeiture of the goods. ' Boyd presented
the invoices and the prosecutor introduced them into evidence
during a forfeiture proceeding.12 4 Boyd argued that the law com-
pelling disclosure amounted to an unauthorized search and seizure
of his books and papers.125 The Supreme Court decided that com-
pulsory production of private papers to establish the charges
against Boyd violated the scope of the fourth amendment, and
therefore, the Court held that compelled disclosure was unconsti-
tutional and void.' 8
In Carroll v. United States127 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether the fourth amendment forbids all searches and
seizures, or only those which are unreasonable. 128 Congress had
proposed an enforcement statute for the National Prohibition Act
which distinguished between the necessity to obtain a warrant to
search a private dwelling, and the absence of necessity to search an
automobile.' 29 Congress reasoned that requiring a warrant to
120. Id. at 655. Rule 323 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for
one procedure to suppress evidence that is allegedly obtained in violation of the defendant's
rights. PA. R. CRM. PROC. 323(a). The original rule was adopted in March 1965, and with its
first revision in November 1968, extended coverage to violations of the fourth amendment
such as identified in Mapp. Id., comment. The Rule was further revised in 1975 to permit
the use of this motion to test the admissibility of evidence when the means by which it was
obtained is challenged. Id.
121. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1353.
122. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Justice Bradley wrote the Court's opinion in which Chief
Justice Waite and Justice Miller concurred. Id.
123. Id. at 618. A congressional act permitted the government in revenue cases to re-
quire the defendant to produce his private papers to prove that sufficient taxes had been
paid. Id. at 619-20.
124. Id. at 618. The defendant, protesting the constitutionality of the Act, complied
and the invoices were used against him over his objection. Id. The jury found for the gov-
ernment and a judgment of forfeiture was entered against the defendant. Id.
125. Id. at 621.
126. Id. at 622.
127. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
128. Id. at 147. Justice Taft delivered the Court's opinion. Justice McKenna concurred
and Justices McReynolds and Sutherland dissented. Id. at 143, 163.
129. Id. at 147. The Act permitted searches of automobiles suspected of carrying con-
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search a car was not practical because an automobile could easily
be moved before a warrant could be obtained. 30
The Supreme Court decided that the vehicle in Carroll could be
searched without a warrant. 181 However, the Court had to consider
under what circumstances a warrantless search was permitted." 2
The Carroll Court established that the "measure of legality of such
a seizure is, therefore, that the seizing officer shall have reasonable
or probable cause" for believing contraband was being carried in
the car. 33 The Court defined probable cause as facts known to a
law enforcement officer that would warrant a prudent, cautious
man to believe an offense had been committed.'3 The Court rea-
soned that a probable cause standard would properly balance the
individual's protection of fourth amendment rights with the gov-
ernment's need to investigate suspected criminal activity.3 3
After establishing the probable cause standard, the United
States Supreme Court considered whether the right to make a war-
rantless search of a person lawfully arrested, and the area where
the arrest was made, could be extended to places which are not
within close proximity to the arrest. 36 In Agnello v. United
States, 87 Agnello was arrested in the home of another defendant
for conspiracy to sell cocaine.'38 While Agnello was taken to the
police station, his house was searched without a warrant and co-
caine was seized and offered as evidence at trial.'3 ' The Supreme
Court concluded the search of Agnello's house was unreasonable
because it was not incident to the arrest, and therefore, the evi-
traband liquor without a warrant. Id. at 143.
130. Id. at 146. The primary reason for the distinction was that obtaining a warrant to
search a car is not always practical because vehicles are so easy to move out of the jurisdic-
tion that might eventually issue such a warrant. Id. at 153.
131. Id.
132. Id. A search of all automobiles travelling the highway on the chance that contra-
band liquor might be found would not be permitted. Searching vehicles as they cross an
international boundary would be permitted to protect national safety. Cars may also be
stopped if a reasonable suspicion exists that they are carrying contraband. Id.
133. Id. at 155-56.
134. Id. at 161 (quoting Locke v. United States, 6 U.S. (7 Cranch) 364 (1813)).
135. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156.
136. Agnello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). Justice Butler wrote the Court's opinion.
The Court said the right to search the area where the arrest is made is not to be doubted.
Id.
137. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
138. Id. at 28. Government revenue agents set up a narcotics buy with the defendant.
The buy occurred at defendant Alba's home. Id.
139. Id. at 29. Agnello testified that he had never seen the can containing the cocaine.
The police stated that they found it in his bedroom. Id. at 30.
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dence found at the house had to be excluded. 4"
In United States v. Rabinowitz,' the United States Supreme
Court examined whether an arrest warrant entitled the police to
search the area beyond the person without a search warrant. 142 A
warrant for Rabinowitz's arrest was obtained and he was arrested
at his place of business. 148 A police officer immediately searched
the office and discovered forged stamps which were offered as evi-
dence to convict Rabinowitz.
1 "
The Supreme Court recognized that the right to search the per-
son was incident to a lawful arrest.1 45 The Court stated that the
fourth amendment permitted searches without a warrant where
the searches were carried out on the "premises where the arrest
was made, which premises were under the control of the person
arrested and the area where the crime was being committed."1 4
Because the present search met all of these criteria, the Rabino-
witz Court concluded that the search of the office was reasonable
and not violative of the fourth amendment.1 4 7
After recognizing that warrantless searches are permitted as an
incidence to a lawful arrest, the United States Supreme Court in
Beck v. Ohio1 48 considered the validity of the arrest in determining
whether an incidental search of the person was permissible. 49 In
140. Id. at 29. The evidence was excluded on the grounds that the search and seizure
were warrantless. Id.
141. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). Justice Minton delivered the Court's opinion. Justice Douglas
did not participate. Id. at 66. Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson dissented. Id. at 66-
68.
142. Id. at 57.
143. Id. at 57. A printer informed the government that the defendant, a stamp dealer,
was selling counterfeit stamps. Id. The government sent an agent to buy stamps, and upon
verifying that they were forged, obtained a warrant. Id. at 57-58. The warrant was based on
reliable information that the defendant had previously committed the same offense and that
he had sold the counterfeit stamps in this instance. Id.
144. Id. at 59. The office was a one room space open to the public and under the
defendant's direct control. The search included the desk, file cabinets and safe. The defend-
ant made motions for suppression of the evidence but they were denied. Reversing the con-
viction, the court of appeals stated that the search was unlawful since the officers had suffi-
cient time to obtain a warrant to search the office and failed to do so. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari because determining the validity of the search was impor-
tant to the administration of justice. Id.
145. Id. at 60 (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392).
146. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 61.
147. Id. at 62. The Court concluded that the criteria were met because the office that
was searched was one room under the direct control of the defendant and he conducted his
business of selling illegal stamps in this room; thus, the search was valid. Id. at 63.
148. 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Justice Stewart wrote for the Court and Justices Clark,
Black and Harlan dissented. Id.
149. Id.
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Beck, the arresting officer testified that he had information that
led to the arrest, but the record did not demonstrate concrete facts
to support the officer's belief that Beck was engaged in unlawful
behavior. 150 The Supreme Court reasoned that when an arrest is
challenged for validity on a constitutional basis, the trial court
must determine whether a prudent, cautious man would have a
reasonable belief that an offense had been committed. 1 ' The
Court cautioned that good faith alone on the part of the police
officer, as the basis for an arrest, was not sufficient to protect
fourth amendment rights.. 2 Thus, the Court concluded in Beck
that a police officer may conduct a warrantless search of a person
incident to a lawful arrest, provided there is probable cause to
make the arrest, and not mere good faith alone."53
In Terry v. Ohio,5 the United States Supreme Court added a
new dimension to the analysis of whether a search and seizure is
reasonable. 155 The question presented to the Court was whether
Terry's right to personal security was violated when the police sub-
jected him to a search and seizure on a public street.5 6 Terry was
stopped and frisked because a police officer believed Terry's be-
havior was suspicious. ' 7 A gun was found in Terry's possession
and he moved to suppress the evidence of the gun, claiming it was
the product of an illegal search and seizure.' The gun was admit-
150. Id. at 90. The defendant was driving his car exhibiting no unusual behavior when
the police stopped him without a warrant, arrested him and searched his person. Id. The
officer provided no concrete facts -that led him to believe a crime had been committed just
that he had "heard reports". Id. at 94.
151. Id. at 96 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162).
152. Beck, 379 U.S. at 97.
153. Id.
154. 392 U.S. 1, 4 (1968).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 8. The officer discovered a concealed weapon on Terry when he patted
down his outer clothing. Id.
157. Id. at 6-7. Terry and another man stood on a street corner taking turns pacing
back and forth in front of a store window which they gazed into with each pass. They were
joined by a third man for a short conference after which he departed. Terry and his com-
panion followed the third man and the police officer followed all three. The officer con-
fronted the men, identified himself as a police officer and questioned the men. The officer
testified he thought one of the men had a gun and he patted down their outer clothing,
producing the gun. Id.
158. Id. The prosecution maintained that the gun had been seized incident to a lawful
arrest. Id. Although the trial court rejected this argument, it denied the motion to supress
the evidence on an alternate ground. Id. at 8. The court concluded that based on the of-
ficer's experience, the defendants were acting suspiciously and the officer could stop them
for questioning. The officer had the right to protect himself by patting down the suspect's
outer clothing for weapons which may have been used against him. The trial court distin-
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ted into evidence at trial and Terry was found guilty on weapons
charges. 1'
The Supreme Court in Terry was presented with two opposing
arguments. 10 The government urged that a distinction be drawn
between "stop and seizure" and "frisk and search" to allow the
police to have a set of flexible responses while doing their job.1 61
This argument contended that the governmental interest in effec-
tive law enforcement outweighed the "petty inconvenience" of a
stop and frisk.18 2 From the opposite position, Terry contended that
the fourth amendment required specific justification prior to any
intrusion into an individual's protected rights. 6s
The first issue considered by the Supreme Court was whether
the use of terms "stop and frisk" removed the police activity from
constitutional scrutiny. 64 The Court found that the fourth amend-
ment governed seizures of a person, including those where a police
officer stops an individual and denies him the freedom to walk
away. 65 Thus, the Court concluded that the activity of stopping a
person on the street warranted fourth amendment protection. 66
The second issue considered by the Terry Court concerned
whether the police actions were reasonable under the fourth
amendment. 67 The Supreme Court proposed that the courts use a
balancing test to weigh the governmental interests that justify in-
trusion into personal security against the nature and extent of the
guished between a frisk and a full blown search. The trial court held that a frisk was essen-
tial to investigatory duties so that the officer would not be shot during the course of his
investigation. Id.
159. Id. The trial court denied Terry's motion to suppress the evidence, and thus, the
evidence was admitted. The appellate court affirmed the verdict and the Ohio Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine if the defendant's rights were violated when the guns were admitted. Id.
160. Id. at 10.
161. Id. Because there are dangerous situations on the city streets, the police need
flexibility in dealing with these situations. It was argued that the police should be permitted
to stop an individual if the officer was suspicious that the individual was involved in crimi-
nal activity, and frisk him if he thought the suspect was armed. Id.
162. Id. The argument urged that a stop and frisk was merely a "minor inconvenience
and petty indignity" when compared to the need for effective law enforcement. Id. at 10-11.
However, the person subjected to the stop and frisk would most likely not consider it to be
either petty or minor. Id.
163. Id. at 11.
164. Id. at 16. The Court stated that using terms other than search and seizure does
not remove the activities from the protection of the fourth amendment. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 19. The fourth amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
167. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
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intrusion. " The Court reasoned that the government possesses a
legitimate interest in not only preventing or stopping crime before
it occurs, but also in ensuring that the police are able to do so
without unwarranted risk that a weapon will be used against
them.
16 9
The Supreme Court recognized that any search of a person is a
serious intrusion into personal security; however, the Court deter-
mined that if the search is limited to searching the outer clothing,
it may be permitted to protect a police officer performing his du-
ties.1 70 The limitation of the search weighed in favor of accomplish-
ing the government's purpose."' Therefore, the Supreme Court
concluded that the police may make a limited search for weapons
if a reasonably prudent man in the same circumstances would be-
lieve a danger exists, even though he is uncertain that the suspect
is armed.
17 2
Based upon their analysis of the two issues, and after applying
the balancing test, the United States Supreme Court in Terry de-
termined that a limited search for weapons did not violate the
fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure, provided that certain requirements are met.17 First, the
police officer must observe suspicious conduct that leads him to
believe that criminal activity is afoot.174 Second, the law enforce-
ment officer must reasonably believe he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous person.'7 5 Finally, the police officer must identify
himself as a law enforcement officer and make reasonable inquiries
of the suspect.17 6 If the officer still believes a danger exists, then he
may make a limited search for weapons. 77 Considering this criteria
in light of the facts in Terry, the Supreme Court concluded the
168. Id. at 20-21. The officer must justify his search by identifying specific facts that
make the search reasonable. Id.
169. Id. at 22. It is the interest in criminal investigation that "underlies recognition
that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner" stop
an individual for the purpose of investigating criminal activity. Id.
170. Id. at 24.
171. Id. at 27.
172. Id. The search must be limited to that which is necessary to discover weapons
which may harm the officer, and it must be less than a "full search." Id. at 26.
173. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1354.
174. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that these




177. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
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stop and frisk in Terry was not a violation of the fourth
amendment." 8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed with the superior
court 7 9 regarding the validity of the stop in Lagana.180 Lagana was
arrested for weapons violations while standing on a street corner.' 8'
The police officer approached and searched Lagana because
Lagana fit the description announced in a radio broadcast of a man
with a gun on a street corner. 8 ' Justice McDermott, writing for the
court, applied the Terry holding to the facts in Lagana and deter-
mined the stop was valid. 83 Supporting Justice McDermott's deci-
sion was the fact that Lagana was standing in the rain looking
through the window of a restaurant with binoculars. 8 This fact,
coupled with the broadcast that there was a man with a gun on
this particular corner, created a reasonable suspicion in the of-
ficer's mind that Lagana was armed, and that criminal activity was
afoot. 85 Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, concluding the
stop was a valid Terry stop, reversed and remanded the case for
trial.' 86
The issue initially presented in Lagana was the admissibility of
the gun to prove the weapons violations. 8 7 Lagana claimed the evi-
dence was improperly seized and could not be admitted. 18 As pre-
viously noted, Mapp held that evidence improperly seized by state
officials cannot be admitted in state court.'89 The Mapp holding
178. Id.
179. The Pennsylvania Superior Court applied the Terry holding to the factual situa-
tion in the Lagana case, concluding that the police officer did not have a reasonable suspi-
cion to make a Terry stop. Lagana, 356 Pa. Super. at 136-37, 514 A.2d at 182. The court
supported its decision that a reasonable suspicion did not exist by stating that the source of
the radio broadcast was unknown, the description was vague, and there was no information
linking Lagana to a crime. Id. The superior court drew a parallel between the factual situa-
tion in Lagana and the factual situation in Commonwealth v. Anderson, 481 Pa. 292, 392
A.2d 1298 (1978). In Anderson, police received a radio message from an unknown source
that an escapee from a drug rehabilitation program was in a bar. Id. at 293, 392 A.2d at
1299. The police discovered a person fitting the general description sitting in the bar. At the
time the police observed the suspect he was not exhibiting any unusual behavior. Id. Thus,
the Anderson court concluded the search was invalid. Id.
180. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1354.
181. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
182. Id.
183. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1354.
184. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
185. Id.
186. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1355.
187. Id. at 1353.
188. Brief for Appellant at 4-5.
189. See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
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has been codified in Rule 323 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure.190 The question of admissibility led to the court's
examination of whether the gun in Lagana was properly seized.
Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had to consider whether
the seizure of the gun was constitutionally valid under the Terry
line of cases.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision that the stop in
Lagana was a valid Terry stop is consistent with previous case law.
In Carroll, the Court held that law enforcement officers were per-
mitted to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if there
was a reasonable suspicion that contraband was being carried.19" '
The basis for the Carroll decision was a balance between the indi-
vidual's fourth amendment rights and the government's need to in-
vestigate criminal activity. 192 Carroll and Lagana are analogous on
several points. First both cases involved a warrantless search, one
of a car,' the other of a person. 94 Second, reasonable suspicion or
probable cause that criminal activity was occurring was required
before the searches could be executed.'95 Finally, both the Carroll
and Lagana courts balanced individual rights against the govern-
ment's interest. 19 6
The facts in Lagana are also similar to those in Terry. In each of
these cases, both men were arrested on a street corner for weapons
violations after being stopped and frisked by a police officer.19 7 The
Terry Court held that a warrantless search was permitted if the
police officer had a reasonable belief that criminal activity was
afoot and the suspect was armed and dangerous.9 8 In Terry, the
police officer observed Terry engaged in suspicious conduct that
the officer believed indicated criminal activity based on his experi-
ence.'99 The police officer confronted Terry, patted down his outer
clothing, and found a gun.200 The Court stated the government had
a legitimate interest in protecting a police officer's safety as he in-
vestigates criminal activity by permitting the police officer to carry
190. See supra note 120.
191. See supra notes 127-135 and accompanying text.
192. Id.
193. Carroll, 116 U.S. at 146.
194. Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1354.
195. See supra notes 154-169 and accompanying text.
196. Id.
197. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7; Lagana, 537 A.2d at 1352-53.
198. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.




out a limited search for weapons."0 '
In Lagana, the police officer was reasonable in his belief that
criminal activity was afoot and that Lagana was armed. The radio
broadcast alerted the officer to look for a man with a gun, creating
a reasonable belief in the police officer's mind that the suspect was
armed and dangerous. Lagana was standing on a street corner en-
gaged in the suspicious activity of looking into a restaurant
through binoculars in the pouring rain. Furthermore, Lagana fit
the reported description of the suspect.20 2 The officer perceived
Lagana engaged in suspicious activity and believed that he might
be armed. These factors justified the police officer's decision to
stop and frisk Lagana. Therefore, based on the Terry line of cases,
the search and seizure in Lagana was constitutionally valid.
Because a constant tension will always exist between the govern-
ment's interest in crime prevention and the individual's fourth
amendment right to be secure in his privacy, both federal and state
courts will constantly be called upon to review police activity and
to rule on its constitutionality. The fourth amendment requires
that searches and seizures be reasonable. Reasonableness requires
that the search be executed pursuant to a warrant meeting consti-
tutional scrutiny, carried out incident to a valid arrest or in con-
junction with a valid Terry stop. 03
The police must make rapid, on the spot decisions about
whether to investigate an individual's behavior. Before acting, the
police must consider their job requirements, personal and public
safety, and whether sufficient facts exist to withstand a fourth
amendment challenge in the courts. Because there is no definitive
test to judge reasonableness or identify whether one search is law-
ful and another unlawful, the courts are charged with the responsi-
bility of guaranteeing that an individual's fourth amendment
rights are protected.
Holly Myers
201. Id. at 22.
202. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 154-169 and accompanying text.
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